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NOTES
THE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE USE OF "POISON PILLS"
WITHIN THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Business Judgment Rule-In General
Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the cor-
poration and its shareholders as a result of their position of control.1 In
general, the standard for the duty of care owed by a director is one of a
prudent person in similar circumstances.2 The duty of loyalty prohibits
1. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS & OFFICERS (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter D. BLOCK].
2. Id. All states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes prescribing a general
standard of conduct for directors and/or authorizing reliance on outside professionals. Id. at
561. Thirty-six states have modeled their statutes after either the MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT § 8.30 (1984) or § 35 of 1969 Model Act (amended in 1974). Section 8.30 of the MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT reads as follows:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a mem-
ber of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if pre-
pared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director rea-
sonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director
reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in
question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
Id. at 562-63.
Three states, Delaware, Kansas, and Oklahoma have statutes that protect directors if they
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directors from engaging in self-dealing transactions and acts of bad faith.'
The business judgment rule operates as a presumption that directors
will act in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interest of the
corporation in rendering corporate decisions.4 As long as directors do not
abuse their discretion, the merits of a decision will be respected by the
court, which will not interfere by substituting its own judgment.' The
business judgment rule acts as a method of judicial review whereby a
court will verify that a business decision was made by disinterested direc-
tors with due care, good faith, and no abuse of discretion.'
The effect of the business judgment rule is to protect directors from
personal liability to the corporation or its shareholders. This protection
exists because directors, as a result of their capabilities and experience,
are in the best position to make corporate decisions.7 Business decisions
are complex and often require quick action, thus courts are ill-equipped
rely in good faith upon records or information provided by certain individuals, however, a
general standard of care is not included in the statute. Id. at 570. Section 141(e) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law reads as follows:
(e) A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by
the board of directors, shall, in the performance of his duties, be fully protected in
relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information,
opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corpora-
tion's officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any other
person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other person's
professional or expert competence and who has been selected with reasonable care by
or on behalf of the corporation.
Id.
Virginia has a unique statute that requires a director to act "in accordance with his good
faith business judgment." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1989). Section 13.1-690
reads as follows:
A. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the
best interests of the corporation.
C. A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
D. A person alleging a violation of this section has a burden of proving the
violation.
Id.
For reference to all state provisions imposing a general standard of directorial conduct,
see D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 561-72 app.
For a discussion of the law in Virginia, see Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation
Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 67 (1985).
3. See D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 1.
4. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The burden of rebutting the presump-
tion is on the party challenging the decision. Id.
5. See D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Id.
7. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 182-83 (4th
ed. 1988).
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to evaluate such decisions.' After-the-fact litigation has the benefit of
hindsight and is thus an imperfect device with which to evaluate corpo-
rate decisions.9 The policy underlying the business judgment rule is to
encourage qualified persons to become directors and to encourage innova-
tive decision making without the constant threat of liability.10
B. The Business Judgment Rule-In the Corporate Takeover Context
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court in Pogostin v. Rice"' held that
the business judgment rule was applicable in the context of a takeover. 2
Whenever a board of directors evaluates a pending takeover bid, they are
required to determine what is in the best interest of the corporation and
its shareholders. 3 One year later, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that, due to the very nature of a
takeover bid, there was the "omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests . . ."' Therefore, there was "an en-
hanced duty which call[ed] for judicial examination at the threshold"
before the business judgment rule would provide protection. 5 The court
in Unocal created a two-prong test which placed the initial burden on the
directors to show: (1) reasonable grounds for believing that there was a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness;' 6 and (2) that the defensive
measure was reasonable in relation to the threat. 7 Once the directors sat-
isfied this burden, the burden of proof shifted back to the challenging
party." The business judgment rule would protect the directors, unless
the plaintiff showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the direc-
8. Id. at 182.
9. Id. at 183.
10. Id.
11. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
12. Id. at 627. A board's refusal to accept a premium from or to negotiate with a potential
acquirer were not found to be prima facie breaches of fiduciary duty. Such a principle would
present directors with a "Hobson's choice" of either having to accept a tender offer! merger
proposal above market value or face liability if they did not. Id.
13. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 955. This can be satisfied by proof of good faith, reasonable investigation, and
materiality enhanced when a majority of independent directors approves it. Id.
17. Id. Proper concerns for this factor included "inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders .... the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered
in the exchange." Id.
18. Id. at 958. But see D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 114-18. The Second Circuit has taken a
different approach to evaluating takeover defenses and the business judgment rule which
focuses more on issues of corporate governance.
For the sake of clarity, this Note will focus on Delaware case law which has been the most
active on the issue.
1989]
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tors tried to perpetuate themselves in office19 or "some other breach of
fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being
uninformed .... 20
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,21 the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that directors were entitled to formulate a takeover pol-
icy either in response to a specific threat or in anticipation of a general,
19. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
20. Id. A landmark decision concerning the informed decision element of the duty of care
was Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Van Gorkom was the chairman and
CEO of Trans Union, a publicly-traded, diversified holding company with primary earnings
stemming from its railcar leasing business. Id. at 864. The company had tremendous cash
flow but had difficulty generating enough taxable income to offset investment tax credits
(ITCs). Id. Van Gorkom lobbied in Washington to have the ITCs refunded in cash. In addi-
tion, Trans Union pursued the purchase of small companies in order to increase taxable
income, yet their problems continued. Id. at 865. Management discussed the possibility of a
leveraged buy-out, and a rough analysis was performed using values of Trans Union shares
at $50 to $60. Id. at 865. Van Gorkom vetoed a leveraged buy-out. However, he proceeded to
meet with a well-known corporate takeover specialist and structured a cash-out merger pro-
posal that was later taken to the board for a vote. Id. at 866-68. There were ten directors on
the Trans Union board, five inside and five outside. Four of the five outside directors were
CEOs and the fifth was the former Dean of the University of Chicago Business School; all
had knowledge of the company's financial condition and were well informed concerning
company operations. Id. at 868. After a two hour board meeting, the proposal was approved
based solely on a twenty minute presentation by Van Gorkom, an inside director's support-
ing representations, the chief financial officer's oral statement that $55 was in the fair range
(albeit at the low end), legal counsel's advice (that the board could be sued if they failed to
accept the offer and that as a matter of law, a fairness opinion was not required), and their
own knowledge of the company's stock market history. Id. at 868-69. Senior management
was not in favor of the merger so Van Gorkom negotiated several amendments to the merger
agreement. These amendments were signed without being read by Van Gorkom or any of
the directors. Van Gorkom then secured the board's approval. The amendments were exe-
cuted with considerable variations from what Van Gorkom told the board. The amend-
ments, as executed, placed serious constraints on Trans Union's ability to negotiate a better
deal. Id. at 870. The merger was later approved by a clear majority of the stockholders. Id.
The Delaware Court of Chancery, in a class action brought by shareholders seeking rescis-
sion of the merger, or money damages in the alternative, concluded that the directors were
protected by the business judgment rule. The court held that the board had given sufficient
time and attention to the transaction and that their conduct was informed and not reckless.
Id. at 870-71.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Van Gorkom held that the trial court committed revers-
ible error by applying the business judgement rule and that the board had breached their
fiduciary duty to stockholders by: (1) their failure to fully inform themselves as to all availa-
ble information; and (2) their failure to disclose all material information that a reasonable
stockholder would need to decide whether to vote in favor of the merger. Id. at 893. The
directors were held liable for damages to the extent that the fair value of Trans Union stock
exceeded the $55 per share price in the merger agreement. Id.
For a summary of the factors in Smith v. Van Gorkom, see D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 48-
52; see also Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAw.
1437 (1985) (analysis of the rejection of the business judgment rule in the Trans Union
case).
21. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), a/i'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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prospective one.22 Pre-planning did not result in the loss of business judg-
ment rule protection, because pre-planning might reduce the risk that the
directors would act unreasonably under the pressure of a hostile bid.23 As
long as a legitimate business purpose existed, defensive tactics could be
implemented in anticipation of a takeover attempt.24
When faced with an unsolicited bid, directors should be aware of cer-
tain guidelines in order to retain their protection under the business judg-
ment rule.25 First, directors are not obligated to sell the company, under-
take an auction in response to a bid, or negotiate with an offerer if they
conclude in good faith that it is not in the best interest of the corporation
or its shareholders to do so. 2 6 Second, the business judgment rule is not
conclusive merely because an offer is received at a premium over market.
The directors have a right and a duty to review the bid and accept or
reject it on a good faith, informed basis.2 7 Third, once it is determined
that the company is for sale, the board's duty changes from preserving
the corporate entity to maximizing the benefit to shareholders. 28
C. Scope
In recent years, takeover battles have increased in number, scope, and
intensity resulting in the development of takeover techniques that make
many corporations vulnerable targets.29 In response, target companies
have developed sophisticated anti-takeover defenses and strategies,30
which raise issues under the business judgment rule.
One popular takeover defense is the "poison pill."'" Poison pills are im-
22. 500 A.2d at 1350.
23. Id.
24. See Mirvis, The Business Judgment Rule and Takeovers: Recent Developments in
Takeover Defense, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY 1986: A REVIEW OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGEMENT RULE 489, 508 (1986).
25. See Fleischer, Lesser & Raymond, Directors Obligations When Faced With an Unso-
licited Bid, in THE 'BUSINESS JUDGMENT' CONFERENCE: PROTECTING OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
FROM LIABILITY 24, 27 (1987) [hereinafter Fleischer].
26. Id. at 27-28.
27. Id. at 28. The directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom were held personally liable for ac-
cepting a bid that was at a premium over market. See Mirvis, supra note 24, at 513-14.
28. See Fleischer, supra note 25, at 28; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986), aflg 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985) (director's
duty changes once the sale of the company is inevitable).
29. Lederman, Current Takeover Techniques, in ANATOMY OF A TAKEOVER BATTLE: FROM
INCEPTION TO CLIMAX 41, 42 (1986).
30. Id.
31. See generally R. WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M. STUMPF & L. PARKER, 3 SHARK REPEL-
LENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER (1988) [hereinafter R.
WINTER]; Helman & Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus. LAW. 771 (1987); Note,
Recent Developments in the Use of the Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense: Limiting the
Business Judgment Rule, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1083 (1987).
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plemented primarily as a means of protecting minority shareholders from
inadequate takeover bids and to give directors negotiating power with po-
tential acquirers."
This Note will explore, within the context of the business judgment
rule, the defensive tactic of implementing a poison pill to ward off hostile
takeover bids and the offensive use of the pill in the negotiating process
with potential acquirers.
II. DEFENSIVE TAKEOVER TACTICS: IMPLEMENTATION OF POISON PILLS
A. Development of Poison Pills: An Overview
The poison pill first appeared in 1983s3 and was considered a daring
defensive tactic that few boards were willing to adopt until tested by the
courts.3 4 In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the implementa-
tion of a poison pill in Moran v. Household International, Inc. 5 This
decision opened the gate for other companies to implement their own ver-
sions. In January, 1988, at least 400 companies had poison pills and thirty
percent of these companies were Fortune 500 companies.38 By mid-1988,
the number of companies with poison pills in place rose to 500.31
For an excellent overview of other takeover defense tactics with citations to applicable
cases, see Note, supra at 1083 n.4. Included among these are the "Pac-Man" defense (where
the target company makes a tender offer for the bidder's stock), the "scorched-earth" de-
fense (where the target company liquidates itself), the "white-knight" defense (where the
target company sells a significant portion to a friendly party to make control by an acquirer
more difficult), the "crown-jewel" method (where the target company sells its most valuable
asset or division to a friendly party), selective self-tender offers, "lock-up" and "leg-up"
options (where the target company gives friendly parties favorable stock options), continu-
ous litigation, and "greenmail" (where the target company self-tenders only the hostile bid-
der's shares). Id.
32. Helman & Junewicz, supra note 31, at 772.
33. See R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 508.
The early versions of poison pills were called convertible preferred stock pills because
they were based on the issuance of convertible preferred stock to common stockholders as
dividends. Balotti & Abrams, Directors' Fiduciary Duties in Corporate Control Contests, in
THE 'BUSINESS JUDGMENT' CONFERENCE, PROTECTING OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS FROM LIABIL-
ITy, 85, 139 (1987). Redemption and conversion provisions were designed to compel a poten-
tial acquirer to purchase 100% of the stock at the same price. If an acquirer purchased a
certain percentage, but no merger occurred, the holder could elect to have his stock re-
deemed at the highest price paid by the acquirer. Id. at 139-40. In the event of a merger, the
preferred stock could be exchanged for an equivalent amount of the acquirer's preferred
stock and converted into common stock at a value equal to the highest price paid by the
acquirer. Id. at 140; see also Helman & Junewicz, supra note 31, at 772; Mirvis, supra note
24, at 568-70.
34. See Helman & Junewicz, supra note 31, at 771.
35. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
36. R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 505.
37. D. BLOCK, supra note 1, at 237.
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The poison pill was more potent when it was first introduced than it is
today. The device was given this venomous label because of the severe
economic consequences an offerer/acquirer would have to "swallow" if
certain types of transactions were completed with the target company. 8
Today, judicial decisions and economic factors have limited the device.
The primary objectives of modern poison pills are to deter abusive take-
over tactics39 and to provide target company directors with some negoti-
ating strength.4
The implementation of a poison pill is a business decision made by the
board of directors which receives the protection of the business judgment
rule if it meets the elevated standards of Unocal.41
While shareholder approval is required for certain defensive mea-
sures,'2 a poison pill can be adopted without shareholder approval. 3
Therefore, judicial scrutiny is heightened when a poison pill is involved
because poison pills can have a significant impact on a shareholder's
chances of receiving a lucrative takeover bid.44
The Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") released a study in
March, 1986 which concluded that the adoption of a poison pill had an
adverse economic impact on a corporation's shareholders. 45 The SEC's ev-
idence of stock market returns suggested "that the effect of poison pills to
deter prospective hostile takeover bids outweigh[ed] the beneficial effects
that come from increased bargaining leverage of the target manage-
ment.' s Proponents of poison pills have criticized the SEC study, claim-
38. R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 505. An example of such a transaction is a second-stage
merger.
39. Id. at 507. Abusive takeover tactics include two-tiered, front-end loaded takeovers;
self-dealing transactions between the offeror and the target company; partial offers; and"street-sweeps", a technique where an offeror makes a tender offer triggering accumulation
by arbitrageurs of the target company's stock, then withdraws the offer, and negotiates with
the arbitrageurs to buy a controlling block of the target company's stock. Id.
40. Id. The presence of a poison pill can make the offeror uncertain as to its ultimate
success and the cost implications, which continue through what can be quite lengthy litiga-
tion. This gives the target company negotiating leverage because they have more time to
respond and look for alternatives or it may interfere with the offeror's ability to get financ-
ing for the transaction. Id. at 507-08.
41. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
42. See Helman & Junewicz, supra note 31, at 777. For example, fair price provisions
require shareholder approval. Id.
43. Id. "A board of directors may increase the legal safety of a poison pill plan by ob-
taining shareholder ratification." Id.
44. Id.
45. A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 83,971, at 88,043-44, (Mar. 5, 1986); see also R. WINTER, supra note 31, at
506-07.
The SEC study found that a target company's stock price declined an average of 2.4% net
of market price upon announcement that a pill would be implemented. Id.
46. Id.
1989]
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ing that the pill benefits the shareholder in the long run.47 A March, 1988
study by Georgeson & Co., Inc., an investor communication firm, revealed
that shareholders in target companies with poison pills received an aver-
age final offer of 78.5% over the price of the stock six months before the
control contest began. Target companies without pills received a gain of
only 57%.48
B. Structure of Modern Poison Pills
The early convertible preferred stock pills49 raised concerns of corpo-
rate procedure and excessive economic power that have been addressed
by the more current forms of poison pills.50 The typical pills today are in
the form of "rights plans"'5 which involve the issuance of "rights" to
purchase securities, whereas the original approach involved the immedi-
ate issuance of equity securities."' A rights plan is implemented by issu-
ing, as dividends to shareholders, the right to purchase one share of com-
mon stock for every share held. The rights are attached to the stock5 3 and
do not separate or become exercisable until some triggering event occurs.
A typical triggering event is the acquisition of twenty percent of the tar-
get company's common stock by any person or a tender offer for thirty
percent or more of the common stock.54 The exercise period is determined
by the board,55 and the exercise price is fixed according to what value the
board and its financial advisors believe the stock will have by the end of
the exercise period.5 6 "Since the exercise price of the rights is 'out of the
money' when issued, the rights will not dilute the [target] company's
earnings per share and should not have any negative impact on the mar-
ket price of the company's common stock."5
47. R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 507.
48. See Fogg & Sterling, Poison Pill Update, in M. KATZ & R. LOEB, ACQUISITIONS AND
MERGERS 1988 817, 844 (1988). Adjusted for the movement of the Standard & Poors 500
Index, companies with poison pills outperformed the S&P Index by 53% whereas those
without pills were at 31% over the S&P Index. Only takeover contests of $100 million or
more were included in Georgeson's study. Id. at 845; see also Lee, Poison Pills' Benefit
Shareholders by Forcing Raiders to Pay More for Targets, Study Says, Wall. St. J., Mar.
31, 1988, at 55, col. 3 (giving details of the Georgeson study).
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50. See R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 571; Helman & Junewicz, supra note 31, at 771-72.
51. Mirvis, supra note 24, at 571.
52. See R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 571.
53. See Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 141. "Initially, the rights are not exercisable,
separate certificates are not issued, and the rights automatically trade with the issuing com-
pany's common stock .... Once the rights detach from the common stock, the rights trade
independently from the common stock and are transferable."
54. R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 571.
55. Mirvis, supra note 24, at 571. (duration of the exercise period is typically 10 years).
56. Id.
57. Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 141; R. WINTER, supra note 31 at 572 ("Out of
the money" refers to the fact that the exercise price of the rights is "higher than the then-
[Vol. 24:127
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Once the rights become exercisable, certain protective provisions allow
the rights holders to purchase securities of the target company or the ac-
quirer at a discount.58 One such protective provision is the "flip-over"
version59 which allows rights holders, in the event that a merger or other
business combination occurs, "to purchase at the exercise price that num-
ber of shares of common stock of the acquiring company which would
have a market value of two times the exercise price."' 0 The economic con-
sequences to the acquirer can be avoided by the redemption of the rights
by the board, at a nominal price, anytime prior to or within a specified
time following the acquisition of twenty percent of the target company's
stock. 1 This redemption feature allows the board of the target company
to negotiate, thereby preventing the rights from interfering with a negoti-
ated merger or a "white-knight" transaction prior to a twenty percent
value of the securities").
Dilution will not occur because the rights do not have to be included in the number of
outstanding shares used in the calculation to determine net earnings per share and book
value. See Mirvis, supra note 24, at 571.
The SEC issued a study on the negative impact of poison pills on the market price of
stock. This study has been confronted with studies showing opposite results. For a discus-
sion of these, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58. See R. WINTER, supra note 31, at 572.
59. Id. "The variations between rights plans center primarily on the difference in treat-
ment of the triggering event, the securities into which the rights are exercisable and the
circumstances under which the rights may be redeemed." Id. Most rights plans have "flip-
over" provisions, however other variations include the "flip-in" provisions and "back-end"
plans. Id.
Whereas flip-over plans allow the rights holder to acquire securities in the acquirer's com-
pany, the flip-in provision allows the rights holder, except the acquirer/offeror, to purchase
securities of the target company. Id. at 574. Flip-in rights were designed in response to the
following concerns: (1) where there were no available securities in the acquiring company;
(2) where there is an abusive takeover involving a first-stage tender offer and an avoidance
of the second-stage business combination because the offeror was able to achieve effective
control; and (3) the possibility of a self-dealing transaction between the target company and
a significant shareholder. Id. at 574-76.
Back-end plans are designed to establish a minimum takeover price for the target com-
pany by insuring that non-tendering shareholders receive a specified value for their shares.
A back-end price is established, equivalent to what the directors believe is a fair price for
the target company. Once the rights are triggered, the rights holders (excluding the offeror)
may exchange their rights (and sometimes their shares) for notes or cash equal to this back-
end price. In addition to establishing a minimum takeover price, back-end plans discourage
partial acquisitions of stock. Id. at 578.
See also Fogg & Sterling, supra note 48, at 819 (For recent variations of new "Poison
Pill" technology).
60. Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 142. (This provision is the devastating feature of
the poison pill because of the dilution effect on the acquirer of the purchase of its stock at
half price); see Mirvis, supra note 24, at 572 (the flip-over provision is effective regardless of
who finally acquires the target company i.e., it does not have to be the same person who
triggered the rights).
61. See Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 142; see also Mirvis, supra note 24, at 573
(Typically, rights can be redeemed for $.05 per right.).
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acquisition.2
The major arguments in support of the flip-over rights plans are that
they: (1) encourage negotiation between the potential acquirer and the
target company in order to avoid the economic consequences of the pill;
(2) deter an acquisition in excess of the triggering amount because this
event makes the rights no longer redeemable; (3) discourage front-end
loaded mergers; (4) preclude self-dealing by a significant shareholder; (5)
presbrve the option to sell the company; and (6) do not dilute the finan-
cial or earning position of the target company. 3 The major arguments in
opposition to flip-over rights plans are that: (1) they may prevent share-
holders from having an opportunity to receive a premium over market
from an acquisition; (2) dissident shareholders claim these plans serve to
entrench directors, and together with other shareholder discontent, could
lead to a proxy fight; (3) directors must decide whether or not to redeem
the rights, and failure to redeem the rights once triggered, will make the
target company an unattractive acquisition candidate since the rights will
remain in effect until the end of the exercise period; and (4) there is some
evidence by the SEC that such plans have a negative impact on the price
of the stock.64
C. Rights Plans Upheld by the Courts
1. Moran v. Household International, Inc.65
Shareholders of Household International, Inc. ("Household") sought to
invalidate the rights plan adopted by a majority of its board of direc-
tors.6 The shareholders claimed that the rights plan restricted the aliena-
62. See Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 142; Mirvis, supra note 24, at 573.
63. Mirvis, supra note 24, at 573-74.
64. Id. at 574. But see supra note 45 and accompanying text (the financial impact studies
of other entities show that there is a favorable impact on the price of the stock).
65. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
66. Id. at 1063. The original plaintiffs were John A. Moran and his company, the largest
single shareholder of Household. Moran was a director on the board of Household and had
voted against the rights plan. Id.
The Household board of directors had 16 members, 9 of whom were outside directors. Id.
at 1064.
The Household rights plan issued one right to each common stock shareholder. The right
had a ten-year exercise period and entitled the holder to buy one one-hundredth of a share
of a new series of nonredeemable participating preferred stock. Id. at 1066. The rights de-
tached and were exercisable upon one of two triggering events. The 20% triggering event
occurred if a person acquired 20% of Household's common shares, achieved the right to
purchase 20%, achieved the right to vote 20%, or formed a group holding 20%. The 30%
triggering event occurred upon announcement of a tender or exchange offer of 30%. Id.
Once the 30% triggering event occurred, the rights detached and were immediately exercisa-
ble to purchase one one-hundredth of a share of the new preferred stock for $100 and were
redeemable at $.50 per right. Id. If the 20% triggering event occurred, the rights were issued
and exercisable, but were no longer redeemable. Id. If a merger or consolidation occurred
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bility and marketability of their shares. In contrast, the directors main-
tained that the plan was an effective deterrent to hostile, abusive
takeovers and was adopted in the best interests of both the corporation
and its shareholders. 7
The directors adopted the rights plan in response to their concerns
about the company's vulnerability as a takeover target 68 rather than in
response to a specific threat. While the flip-over provision was seen by the
board as a "strong negotiating device" to use against a potential acquirer,
it would not render the company takeover-proof. 9 Furthermore, the di-
rectors claimed their decision to implement the plan was protected by the
business judgment rule because it was presumed that the board was will-
ing to consider all takeover proposals and redeem the rights if necessary
to permit an attractive bid to proceed.7 0
The Delaware Chancery Court upheld the rights plan as an "appropri-
ate exercise of managerial judgment under the business judgment rule."'71
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision by ap-
plying the standard of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 72 The court
held that the board had the authority to enact the plan 73 and that the
plan did not prevent the stockholders from receiving tender offers.74
Then, the court proceeded to apply the Unocal test.75 There were no alle-
and in the agreement, Household shares were exchanged for securities of the acquirer, unex-
ercised rights flip-over and the holder can purchase common stock of the acquirer at a price
reflecting a market value of two times the exercise price. Id.
67. Id. at 1064.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1066 (determined acquirer, willing to accept moderate dilution in the second
step of a takeover or to condition an offer on surrender of a certain percentage of the rights,
could still accomplish a takeover).
70. Id. at 1072.
71. Id. at 1083. The Chancery Court found that the plan had been properly adopted
under Delaware law, was not intended to entrench management, and served a rational cor-
porate purpose. Id. at 1082. While the plan may have restricted alienability indirectly, it was
considered necessary to protect the corporation and its constituencies from hostile take-
overs. Id. The plan did not represent an irreversible alternative like other takeover devices.
While the board adopted a resolution indicating its interest to stay independent, the direc-
tors also claimed that acquisition proposals would be considered in good faith. Id. at 1083.
72. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Delaware Chancery Court heard Moran in January,
1985. The Delaware Supreme Court did not hear Unocal until May, 1985, and the appeal in
Moran was heard in November, 1985.
73. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del.), aff'g 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985) (court noted
that the inherent powers conferred by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Repl. Vol. 1983),
provided the board with this authority).
74. Id. at 1354 (court described several methods by which Household could still be ac-
quired, one of which was the famous takeover of Crown Zellerbach by Sir James Goldsmith).
75. Under Unocal, the directors have the initial burden of showing they had reasonable
grounds for believing there was a danger to the corporation through good faith and reasona-
ble investigation. Id. at 1356 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). In addition, the directors
must demonstrate that the defensive device was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
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gations of bad faith or entrenchment, and the board effectively demon-
strated that the plan was adopted in reaction to what they perceived as
the threat of a coercive tender offer.7" The court also found that the di-
rectors' fear over the increased frequency of hostile takeovers and House-
hold's vulnerability to coercive acquisition techniques made the plan a
reasonable defense mechanism. 77
2. Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. 8
The board of Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. ("SFI") adopted a
poison pill "for the purpose of thwarting any competitive offers by outsid-
ers to obtain control of SFI." 79 The rights plan adopted by the board was
similar to that of Household, except that the acquiring company could
avoid the flip-over provision by buying out the rightss0 at an exorbitant
cash premium, an alternative, albeit a costly one, to dilution."1
The directors claimed the plan was implemented to protect the corpo-
ration and its shareholders from unfair, two-tiered tender offers." Faced
with two unsuccessful acquisition offers, the board 8 instructed manage-
ment to concentrate on business operations. 4 The plan was recom-
Proof is enhanced if a majority of the board consists of outside, independent directors. The
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show
the directors breached their fiduciary duties. Id.
76. Id. at 1356. The appellants did claim that the directors were uninformed. The stan-
dard for determining whether a decision is informed and thus protected by the business
judgment rule is gross negligence. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The
Moran court concluded that the directors were not grossly negligent. Moran, 500 A.2d at
1356.
77. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. Earlier in the opinion, the court held that the directors did
not lose the protection of the business judgment rule because they were not reacting to a
specific threat. Id. at 1350. In fact, the court found that pre-planning might even reduce the
risk of unreasonable action by the board because they were not under the pressure of a
takeover bid. Id.
78. 604 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Nev. 1985).
79. Id. at 1132.
80. Id. The rights plan involved the issuance of poison pill warrants; see Comment,
"Poison Pill" Warrants and the Business Judgment Rule: Moran v. Household Interna-
tional, Inc., 66 OR. L. REv. 373, 377 n.23 (1987) ("Poison pill warrants function as a 'put.' A
put is a right to buy a certain amount of stock at a specific price within a stipulated time.
The right may be sold separately or attached to stock as a warrant.").
81. Horwitz, 604 F. Supp. at 1132.
82. Id. at 1133. Under a two-tiered tender offer, the acquirer makes an attractive cash
offer for a controlling position and offers less per share which often includes securities
rather than all cash for the remaining stock. Id. This front-end loaded, two-tiered tender
offer is coercive because stockholders feel compelled to tender their stock in the first tier,
even if the offer is inadequate, for fear of receiving less in the second tier. Id.
83. The board consisted of twelve directors, eleven of whom were non-management. Id.
84. Id. One offer had come from inside but fell apart for lack of financing. Id. The second
offer came from an outside group, but failed because they did not make a formal offer and
did not demonstrate adequate financing. Id.
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mended as part of a five-year management plan to develop and expand
the company. The Nevada District Court found that the decision to
"build the value of a company from within, rather than through merger
or takeover may be a rational exercise of business judgment"'8 5 and up-
held the board's decision due to the unlikelihood that the plaintiff could
show that the directors breached their fiduciary duty. 6
3. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.87
The board of Revlon, Inc. ("Revlon") adopted a Notes Purchase Rights
Plan in response to a hostile takeover bid by Pantry Pride, at what the
board considered a grossly inadequate price.8 Under the two-prong test
of Unocal, the court held that the adoption of the plan was based on
reasonable grounds.8 9 In addition, the plan was reasonable in relation to
the threat and was responsible for spurring the bidding to higher levels.90
Due to subsequent actions by the board, the rights were redeemed, and
the propriety of the plan became a moot issue.91
4. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (The Second Poison Pill)92
CTS Corp. ("CTS") adopted its first poison pill plan to block a tender
offer by Dynamics Corp. of America ("Dynamics"), regardless of the con-
sequences to the shareholders.9 The district court issued a preliminary
injunction against this flip-over pill which was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.9 Then, CTS appointed a committee of outside directors who rec-
ommended a back-end rights plan that was subsequently adopted by the
85. Id. at 1135 (citing Ponter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir. 1981)).
86. Id. at 1136.
87. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
88. Id. at 176-77.
89. Id. at 180-81. The plan was considered reasonable because it protected the sharehold-
ers from a hostile takeover bid at less than a fair price while maintaining the board's ability
to consider acquisition proposals that might be in the shareholders' best interests.
90. Id. at 181.
91. Id. However, Revlon is still a significant case because the court held that once the
break-up of a company was inevitable, the board's duty changed from one of protecting the
corporation and its shareholders to one of maximizing the value to the shareholders. Id. at
182. The board's responsibilities under the Unocal standard were altered and the question
of defensive measures became moot. Id.
The court finally held that Revlon's board, in granting an asset lock-up to a bidder in
order to forestall Pantry Pride, was motivated by considerations other than the maximiza-
tion of shareholder value, and that it entered into an agreement that was "to the ultimate
detriment of its shareholders." Id. at 185.
92. 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 708; see generally infra pp. 141-43. (For the case history concerning the first
pill see Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th
Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
94. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d at 259; see also Balotti & Adams, supra note 33, at 152.
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entire board as part of their strategy to sell the company.9 5 The district
court found that the second pill was not devised solely to block a tender
offer (an improper motive), but to maximize shareholders' profits once it
was determined that the company was for sale." In deciding the terms of
the second pill, CTS expressed the following two concerns: (1) if Dynam-
ics purchased enough shares it could obtain a "blocking position" that
would deter other bidders; and (2) Dynamics could acquire the additional
shares without first paying a premium for obtaining control of the com-
pany." Even though the district court upheld the plan, the Seventh Cir-
cuit expressed doubt that the 28% trigger98 could result in "blocking
power" 9 and rejected the argument that the 28% trigger was necessary to
insure shareholders a control premium. 0 0 Furthermore, the court ques-
tioned the reasonableness of the trigger price of $50 given the methods
used in computing it.1' 1 Although the Seventh Circuit did not believe the
district court clearly erred in its decision to uphold the plan, there were
sufficient questions of fact to cause the court to remand for further
findings.' 0 '
95. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 707. The board adopted the second pill on the same day that
the Seventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction of the first pill. Id.
This second pill was devised by a special committee of outside directors with the help of
its investment advisor, Smith Barney. Id. at 709. The Seventh Circuit was very suspicious of
the fee arrangement between CTS and Smith Barney which was unclear in the trial record.
Id. at 710-11. Although this alone was not enough to reverse or remand the case, it may have
been a factor in the Seventh Circuit's decision to vacate and remand for further considera-
tion. Id. at 711.
96. Id. at 709-10. The directors' duty, once the company was for sale, changed from one of
acting in the best interests of the corporation to one of maximizing shareholder wealth.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
The second poison pill had a trigger of 28%. If any shareholder obtained 28%, all other
shareholders could exchange their shares for a $50 debenture payable after one year, with
10% interest. The plan was effective for one year and could be cancelled by the board at any
time, or automatically if anyone made a cash tender offer of $50 or more. CTS Corp., 805
F.2d at 707.
97. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 710.
The district court accepted as a "rational assumption" the advice given to CTS by Smith
Barney that Dynamics, as a minority shareholder, could obtain blocking power by making a
contrary bid at a higher price. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. at 1179.
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d at 712 (court stated, "[d]espite much talk of 'blocking positions,'
the record contains no evidence as to how Dynamics could use 28% or any other fractional
ownership short of 50% to block anything.").
100. Id. at 712-13.
101. Id. at 714-15.
102. Id. at 716.
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D. Rights Plans Invalidated by the Courts
1. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. (The First Poison Pill)10 3
CTS adopted the first poison pill plan for what the court determined
was the express purpose of defeating the hostile tender offer by Dynamics
Corp. of America ("Dynamics").'04 The court's major concern was the
flip-in provision that would have caused Dynamics to suffer dilution'05
and severe economic loss.106
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recognized that
Indiana law governed this case, and that Indiana looked to Delaware deci-
sions for guidance.10 7 The court reviewed the decisions in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 08 Moran v. Household International, Inc.,0 9 and
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."0 before concluding
that this case was distinguishable from the standards of director conduct
upheld in the Delaware cases."'
First, the court found evidence that CTS directors had an entrench-
ment purpose in implementing the pill because of the almost immediate
decision by management to oppose Dynamics' tender offer." 2 Since Dy-
namics openly threatened to engage in a proxy contest to put its own
103. 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
104. Id. at 407. Dynamics, a 9.7% shareholder in CTS, announced a tender offer for up to
1,000,000 shares at an eight dollar premium over market which would have given Dynamics
a 27.7% interest. Id. Dynamics also announced its intention to wage a proxy contest to elect
its own slate of directors to the CTS board. Id.
The pill had a flip-in provision that was triggered whenever anyone acquired 15% or more
of CTS's common stock. When this occurred the rights became non-redeemable, and the
holders, other than the acquirer, became entitled to purchase a unit of CTS securities at a
price equal to 25% of current market value. Id. This provision caused the acquirer to suffer
immediate economic loss, thereby forcing hostile bidders to negotiate with management. Id.
The pill also had a flip-over provision which occurred upon the acquisition of CTS. The
rights holder was entitled to purchase common stock of the acquiring company with a mar-
ket value of $150 for the exercise price of $75. Id.
105. Once the flip-in provision was triggered and assuming all rights were exercised, Dy-
namics' interest decreased to 20.7%. Id. at 407. Also, when CTS issued rights to purchase
securities (including debentures), the value of the company decreased because of the new
debt. Id. at 407-08.
106. The dilution would cost Dynamics approximately $24 million if it completed the ac-
quisition. Id. at 408.
107. Id. This action was filed seeking preliminary injunctive relief requiring the plaintiff
to show probability of success on the merits, possibility of immediate and irreparable harm
that outweighs possible harm to the defendant, and no harm to the public interest. Id.
108. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
109. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
110. 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
111. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 411.
112. Id. at 416.
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nominees on the board,113 the court saw the flip-in plan, designed with a
low acquisition level (15%), as a maneuver that would make mounting a
proxy contest very difficult.114 The court also found that the directors
may not have made a reasonable investigation into the actual threat from
Dynamics since there appeared to be conflicting testimony among the
board members.115 Finally, the court decided that CTS directors had not
shown that this rights plan was a reasonable response to the threat of a
takeover by Dynamics."' The directors knew that the plan would
strengthen management in a proxy contest, which was not a legitimate
purpose for enacting a defensive mechanism; and with no other reasons
articulated, the plan was not reasonable in relation to the threat. 17
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit expressed general misgivings about
poison pills.' The court then affirmed the district court's invalidation of
CTS's plan, on the basis that it violated the fiduciary obligations of
CTS's management and directors. 9
2. Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp."2 0
The Buckhorn, Inc. ("Buckhorn") poison pill was a back-end plan im-
plemented to protect shareholders from "Ropak's coercive, two-tiered,
and inadequate tender offer and to assure for those shareholders on the
'back-end' a fair price for their stock."'' The district court found the
113. Id. at 407.
114. Id. at 417. A 15% triggering event was lower than any plan known to have been
adopted. The court could not see another reason, other than a proxy contest, for using this
lower threshold. Id.
115. Id. Gross negligence is the standard to determine whether a board exercises informed
judgment. Id. While there was some evidence of gross negligence, the conflicting testimony
and a passive stance by the board as management shaped CTS's response to the tender
offer, gross negligence had not been established. Id.
Earlier in the opinion, the court did say that management had a reason to fear Dynamics
due to antagonistic relations in the past. Id. at 416. The problem was that the directors did
not seem to focus on this in making their decision. Id.
116: Id. at 417.
117. Id. at 418. There was even evidence that the flip-in plan would deter all hostile ac-
quisitions and did not spur a bidding contest, but in fact depressed the market for CTS
stock. Id.
Legitimate purposes for enacting defensive mechanisms appeared in Moran and Revlon.
In Moran, the concern was that a two-tiered merger would dilute shareholders' investment.
Id. In Revlon, the goal was to preserve value for minority shareholders. In neither case was
there specific regard to entrenchment as was evidenced here by the known effect on proxy
contests. Id.
118. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
119. Id. at 253, 259.
120. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), afi'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987) (decided without a
published opinion).
121. Id. at 228.
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directors had reasonable grounds to believe Ropak Corp.'s ("Ropak")
tender offer was two-tiered because the directors were experienced and
their opinion was supported by the professional advice of an investment
banker. 122 In addition, the court believed the directors had "in good faith
and after reasonable investigation" concluded that the price offered by
Ropak was inadequate.' 2'
However, the poison pill was enjoined because the directors failed to
fully inform themselves of material information in setting the exercise
price of the rights in the plan. 24 Since the pricing decision made by the
directors essentially preempted the marketplace, an informed decision
was imperative. 25 There were material deficiencies in the assumptions
used to set the exercise price which the directors could have discovered
upon reasonable inquiry. 2 Therefore, the directors could not satisfy ei-
ther prong of the Unocal test since the pricing decision was not made on
reasonable grounds and the prices set were not reasonably related to the
interests of the shareholders.127
III. OFFENSIVE TAKEOVER TACTICS: CONTINUED USE OF THE PILL
A. Background for Current Litigation
The implementation of a poison pill, essentially a device to resist hos-
tile takeovers, may benefit the shareholders by raising their stock prices
(through negotiation between the target company and acquirer) or by al-
lowing the company to remain independent and build value from
within."" There is no real dispute in the courts that defensive measures,
including poison pills, are within the power of a target company's direc-
tors,"2 provided the directors meet their fiduciary burden under the two-
prong Unocal test.130 A key issue in recent litigation"' concerns directors
122. Id. at 229.
123. Id. (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
124. Id. at 231. If a poison pill is over-priced, it becomes a "show-stopper" preventing the
shareholder from receiving a fair price. Id. at 230. Although this is a business decision, it is
only protected by the business judgment rule if the directors show that they fully informed
themselves. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 231.
127. Id.
128. See Balotti & Abrams, supra note 33, at 107.
129. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986);
accord Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
130. See supra notes 16-17.
131. Although this issue is the focus of more recent litigation, it is not a new issue. The
Minnesota District Court in Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn.
1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987), found that refusal to
redeem rights was a reasonable response to a hostile bid that was contrary to the best inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 849. The court stated further that the
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faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the rights. In Moran v.
Household International, Inc.,1 2 the Delaware Supreme Court said in
dicta that a board cannot arbitrarily reject an offer and will be held to the
same fiduciary standards governing the implementation of a rights
plan.1 33
B. Refusal to Redeem Rights Plans Upheld by the Courts
1. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.134
In Federated, CRTF Corp. ("CRTF") made a cash tender offer for all
the shares of Federated Department Stores ("Federated"). On the same
day, CRTF filed suit for a preliminary injunction against Federated,
claiming that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty in adopting
a poison pill and refusing to redeem the rights.135 Federated had agreed
to redeem the rights with respect to a competing offer from R.H. Macy &
Co. 13
6
While Federated claimed the continued use of the pill was necessary to
defend against CRTF's coercive offer and to increase bidding,13 CRTF
claimed that once an auction was underway, all defensive measures must
be dropped.13s The New York District Court, applying Delaware law, con-
cluded that there was no evidence that Federated directors had acted for
mere fact that a bid represents a premium above market value does not require the target
company to submit to a merger. Id. at 849-50.
132. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
133. Id. at 1354. Specifically, the court concluded its opinion by stating:
While we conclude for present purposes that the Household Directors are protected
by the business judgment rule, that does not end the matter. The ultimate response
to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at that time, and
nothing we say here relieves them of their basic fundamental duties to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders (citations omitted). Their use of the Plan will be evaluated
when and if the issue arises.
Id. at 1357 (citations omitted).
134. 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
135. Id. at 433.
136. Id. The parties were in agreement that an auction, of the sort described in Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), was underway.
Under this type of auction, the directors duty becomes one of maximizing value to the
shareholders. 683 F. Supp. at 443.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 439. Federated cited language from the Revlon case:
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justi-
fiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interest, but when bidders
make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the
directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the
contending factions.
Id. (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986)).
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reasons other than shareholder interest. 39 The court interpreted the lan-
guage in Revlon, which required that market forces be allowed to bring
the best price available to shareholders, as demanding that directors do
what was necessary to sell the company at the highest possible price.140 It
was clear to the court that Delaware law did not require the directors to
be a "passive observer" and that directors had "the right to use [their]
powers to defeat a coercive, two-tiered, front-end loaded bid . . . where
the Board believe[d] the offer would not be in the best interests of the
shareholders. '14 1
The court held that, as part of the duty to auction, the directors "may
selectively invoke or waive rights under a previously adopted 'Poison Pill'
in order to further the auction and to raise the bidding.1' 42 If selective
invocation of rights becomes an issue at the end of an auction, 143 the
court said it must then carefully scrutinize the board's actions to deter-
mine if improper considerations such as conflicts or insider preferences
were present.1 44
2. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc.145
BNS, Inc. ("BNS") challenged the reasonableness of the Koppers Co.,
Inc. ("Koppers") directors' refusal to redeem rights in response to BNS's
tender offer for all of Koppers' outstanding stock.146 The court stated that
the directors "have a continuing duty to evaluate the fitness of their de-
fensive strategy in light of developments in the ongoing battle' ' 47 and
their actions should also conform to the standards set forth in Unocal.4s
In applying these standards, the court found that the directors acted
reasonably in rejecting BNS's first and second offers as inadequate,1 49 be-
139. Id. at 440.
140. Id. at 441. The directors are afforded a great deal of discretion, as long as their
motive is to enhance bidding and to raise the price for the benefit of shareholders Id.
141. Id. at 440.
142. Id. at 424.
143. Id. at 442. In this case, the court determined that "the auction [was] still in progress,
especially in the absence of a representation by CRTF both that it believe[d] its bid [was]
the higher, and that, in the absence of a still higher, later, competing bid, it has made its
highest and final bid." Id.
144. Id.
145. 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
146. Id. at 473. Koppers adopted its rights plan in February, 1986, and the plan contained
both flip-in and flip-over provisions. Id. at 462.
147. Id. at 474. The court cited language from Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. as support:
"The Board has no more discretion in refusing to redeem the Rights than it does in enacting
any defensive mechanism." Id., (quoting Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354
(Del. 1985)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 475. The directors did not reject the first offer until it had seriously analyzed
the relevant factors, including its own valuation of the company, the advice of its invest-
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cause the inadequacy of the price constituted a threat to the corporation
and its shareholders.1 50 BNS claimed that Koppers directors' refusal to
negotiate represented bad faith, but the court found there was no duty to
negotiate.' 5 ' Even if there were a duty, Koppers had not taken irrevocable
steps to defeat BNS's offer, nor had they taken steps to put the company
on the auction block.' 5' In the final analysis, the directors' refusal to ne-
gotiate and redeem the rights caused BNS to increase their bid twice. 5'
3. Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc.15 4
Facet Enterprises, Inc. ("Facet") implemented a flip-in rights plan af-
ter Prospect Group, Inc. ("Prospect") issued an all cash tender offer. 5
Facet's objectives in implementing the plan were to increase its ability to
negotiate, to allow the board more time to consider alternatives, to pro-
tect shareholders from an unfair, back-end merger, and to deter a "street
sweep" or "creeping acquisition."' 5 6 Prospect claimed it would be a
breach of fiduciary duty for Facet's directors to "hide behind a poison
pill" and prevent shareholders from deciding for themselves whether or
not to accept an offer. Facet responded that since an auction was about to
begin, it was proper to keep the pill in place to fulfill its intended
objectives.'57
The Delaware Chancery Court recognized the directors' role as a nego-
tiator and restated their view of the directors' fiduciary duty from Mo-
ran. 5 The court then addressed the issue of whether the directors should
be allowed to keep the rights in place until the auction process has rea-
ment bankers, the possibility of better offers, and the likelihood of failure of the BNS offer.
Id. The second offer was similarly evaluated and rejected. Id.
150. Id. The court also stated that Koppers' directors were considering a recapitalization
plan, but had not yet endorsed or announced a particular plan. Only when the company
took definitive action could the court possibly intervene. Id.
151. Id. at 476. The court noted that the plaintiff cited no cases imposing such a duty. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 1988 WL 36140 (Del. Ch. 1988).
155. Id. at *3.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *4-5.
158. The court reviewed the principles in Moran as follows:
A board armed with a Rights Plan of the type now under review will possess a bar-
gaining tool which can be used to extract concessions from an acquiror [sic] which it
otherwise would not secure, or to deter the acquisition effort entirely. Through its
power to redeem the rights before a triggering event occurs the Household Board has
assumed a plenary negotiating role. It has also taken upon itself the responsibility for
assuring that the rights are not triggered in such a fashion as to inflict harm upon the
corporation by rendering it acquisition-proof.
Id. at *6, (quoting Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc. 490 A.2d 1059, 1083 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)).
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sonably run its course."'159 The court concluded that it should not enjoin
the plan and/or require redemption of the rights until Facet had a "rea-
sonable opportunity to conduct and complete the auction."'160 Citing Fed-
erated, the court stated that a properly used poison pill provided a"shield" against coercive offers and a "gavel" to conduct an auction.' 6 '
4. Recent Cases
In Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp.,' the Delaware Chan-
cery Court stated that under Delaware law, the directors have a duty to
oppose inadequate offers. A court should not order redemption of rights
where the shareholders' ability to realize the full value of their shares
would be adversely affected.'63
The Delaware Chancery Court refused to order the redemption of
rights in the case of In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation,64
because there was no evidence that the board was improperly using the
pill.'65 The court did enjoin several features of the auction, 66 so that the
directors could carry out their duty to maximize shareholder value, but
the court found the pill was sufficiently functioning to meet the objective
of shareholder value maximization. 61
C. Redemption of Rights Ordered by the Court
1. Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc. 68
In 1986, Moore McCormack Resources, Inc. ("Moore McCormack") suf-
fered large operating losses, and shortly thereafter, adopted a shareholder
rights plan.' The court determined that "[s]etting up barriers to owner
control after a disastrous performance support[ed] an inference that the
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id. at *7.
161. Id. at *6.
162. 1988-89 Transfer Binder Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,040, at 90,868 (Del. Ch. Sept.
16, 1988) (case involved a flip-in rights plan where the court refused to order redemption of
rights).
163. Id. at 90,872.
164. 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id. These features included a lock-up provision, termination fee, and reimbursement
provisions. The court enjoined them because they appeared to preclude a genuine auction.
Id.
167. Id.
168. 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
169. Id. at 601. The board did not get shareholder approval for the rights plan (approval
was not required). The board also passed several by-law amendments that served to
strengthen management's position. Id.
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action was not taken to serve the shareholders."' 0
Southdown, Inc. ("Southdown") made an unsolicited, all cash, non-co-
ercive tender offer,' and after three amendments, the price offered was
well within valuations made by Moore McCormack and its investment
bankers." 2 The court found Moore McCormack's statements that the of-
fer was inadequate to be conclusory and "at best, a market-manipulative
falsehood to perpetuate the management's incumbency.1' 73 Southdown's
offer for the stock exceeded the price levels that management had been
able to achieve through their own performance. Although federal securi-
ties laws allowed management time to persuade shareholders "to choose
management over merger" and shop for other bidders, Moore McCor-
mack had stalled too long and it was time to let the shareholders de-
cide. 74 Continued use of the pill, by not redeeming the rights, constituted
a threat to the company's financial health and the rights of its
shareholders." 5
2. City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc.7 1
City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership ("CCA") made a non-coercive,
all cash tender offer 77 which Interco, Inc. ("Interco") rejected as inade-
quate. 78 Interco had acted prudently in determining the value of their
own stock and had designed a restructuring that they believed had
slightly greater stock value than CCA's tender offer.179 Interco refused to
redeem the rights of its "flip-in" poison pill because the directors feared
that shareholders would choose to accept the tender offer of cash, rather
170. Id. The court found other evidence, such as revaluation of stock options, that led
them to conclude that the directors "placed their personal relationships above the share-
holders' rights." Id. The exercise price of stock options for the CEO were adjusted down-
ward after the 1987 stock market crash. Id. This diluted shares of surviving shareholders
and increased the cost to a potential acquirer. Id.
171. Id. at 602. The court distinguished this from a two-tiered, front-end loaded offer. Id.
Southdown's offer allowed shareholders to make a decision under "neutral economic criteria
without pressure of potential exclusion" because a shareholder would get the same amount
regardless of whether the shareholder waited to sell after Southdown acquired a controlling
share. Id.
172. Id. at 603. In fact, Southdown's last offer reflected a 68% premium over the pre-offer
market price. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 604. Under federal securities law, a tender offer must remain open for 10 days.
Since Southdown amended its offer three times, Moore McCormack had over 40 days to
shop the company. Id. at 602.
175. Id. at 602.
176. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
177. Id. at 790.
178. Id. at 795.
179. Id. CCA's final offer was for $74 cash per share and Interco valued its restructuring
for at least $76 per share. Id.
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than accept the assumptions on which the restructuring valuation was
based.'8 0 Interco claimed that shareholders' interests would be damaged
by CCA's inadequate bid, and that the pill had to be kept in place to
protect the restructuring that would give the shareholders greater
value.' 81
It was clear to the court that the continued use of the pin was not to
give the board time to explore alternatives or to negotiate for a higher
bid, but to deprive the shareholders of the opportunity to accept a non-
coercive offer.' 2 CCA's offer could not be considered a threat to the
shareholders' interest, due to the similarity of the offer and the value
under the restructuring as well as the uncertainty of key assumptions
used in formulating the restructuring value. 18 3 In applying the Unocal
test, the court concluded that keeping the pill in place was not reasonable
in relation to the threat.'8 The directors' fiduciary duty required them to
redeem the rights and let the shareholders choose. 8 5
3. Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co."'
Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met") claimed that Pillsbury Com-
pany's ("Pillsbury") refusal to redeem the rights of its "flip-in" plan vio-
lated the fundamental rule of corporate governance.' 8' Pillsbury claimed
its decision was made in good faith, by independent directors, who after
reasonable investigation, concluded that the decision was in the best in-
terests of the shareholders and the corporation. 8 Pillsbury believed its
actions were protected by the business judgment rule because the plan
was reasonable in relation to the threat of an inadequate bid.8 9 The Del-
180. Id. at 799.
181. Id. at 795.
182. Id. at 799-800.
183. Id. at 799.
184. Id. at 800. The court elaborated earlier in the opinion on the nature of threats to
shareholders and essentially laid out two types: 1) threats to "voluntariness" that come up
in the two-tiered, front-end loaded offers where a shareholder must decide in the first stage
or risk a lesser value for his shares in the second stage and; (2) threats from "inadequate"
but non-coercive offers whereby continued use of the pill could result in a higher bid or an
alternate proposal. Id. at 797.
185. Id. at 799.
186. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
187. Id. at 1053. The fundamental rule of corporate governance is that shareholders ar
the owners of a corporation, and a poison pill acts as a barrier to the shareholders' consider-
ation of an offer to sell its share. Shareholders were the owners of a corporation, and that
the poison pill acted as a barrier to the shareholders' consideration of an offer to sell their
shares. Id.
188. Id. at 1054.
189. Id. In an earlier slip opinion, Justice Duffy said that although a pill effectively acts
as a barrier to shareholders' consideration of a tender offer, Pillsbury's exploration of alter-
natives could go on indefinitely as long as the offers on the table were coercive or inade-
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aware Chancery Court concluded that the bid was adequate and the di-
rectors' refusal to redeem the rights served only to preclude shareholders
from accepting the tender offer.190 Therefore, the decision to keep the pill
in place was not reasonable in relation to the threat and not protected by
the business judgment rule.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The number of companies implementing sophisticated defense devices,
such as the "poison pill," is increasing dramatically. As long as share-
holder approval is not required, issues of fiduciary duty and business
judgment will continue to be litigated in the courts. The Delaware courts
have created a framework for analysis, and controversial litigation has
moved from implementation of shareholder rights plans to continued use
of the plans by the refusal to redeem rights.
The courts appear willing to continue to extend the protection of the
business judgment rule to boards decisions as long as the directors are
motivated by concerns for the corporation and the best interests of the
shareholders. Evidence of good faith and informed judgment are critical
factors that will be scrutinized by the court. It is recommended that a
corporation considering a takeover policy document a strategy, seek a
thorough valuation from its investment banker, maintain a majority of
disinterested directors on the board, and keep the directors informed as
to all aspects of the decision. A board of directors can refuse to negotiate
as long as tender offers are inadequate or coercive, but there comes a
point when the board must let the shareholders decide for themselves
whether to accept a tender offer. The courts, although reluctant to substi-
tute their judgment in complex business decisions, are subjecting corpo-
rate boards of directors to a heightened level of scrutiny and will enjoin
abuses of discretion that can often accompany such positions of power.
Wendy B. Gayle
quate. The court said noncoercive, all cash, all shares offer can be a threat to shareholders if
it is inadequate. See 1988 WL 119402 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1988)(revised Nov. 9, 1988).
190. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060. The bid was not considered inadequate because Grand
Met's tender offer was the only factor supporting Pillsbury's present stock price and Pills-
bury's valuation based on building from within was based on numerous "if" assumptions.
Id. at 1057-58. It should be the stockholder's choice to decide whether to take the tender
offer or wait to see if Pillsbury's assumptions become reality. Id. at 1057.
191. Id. at 1060.
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